This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Download to citation manager Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Kress, M. Articles by Szechtman, R. Search for Related Content

Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations—A Best-Case Scenario

Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943
mkress{at}nps.edu
rszechtm{at}nps.edu

In insurgency situations, the government-organized force is confronted by a small guerrilla group that is dispersed in the general population with no or a very small signature. Effective counterinsurgency operations require good intelligence. Absent intelligence, not only might the insurgents escape unharmed and continue their violent actions, but collateral damage caused to the general population from poor targeting may generate adverse response against the government and create popular support for the insurgents, which may result in higher recruitment to the insurgency. We model the dynamic relations among intelligence, collateral casualties in the population, attrition, recruitment to the insurgency, and reinforcement to the government force. Even under best-case assumptions, we show that the government cannot totally eradicate the insurgency by force. The best it can do is contain it at a certain fixed level.

Subject classifications: counterinsurgency; intelligence; Lanchester models.
History: Received January 2008; revision received June 2008; accepted January 2009.