Operations Research
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OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Vol. 56, No. 6, November-December 2008, pp. 1493-1506
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0527
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Supply Chain Coordination and Influenza Vaccination

Stephen E. Chick, Hamed Mamani, David Simchi-Levi

Technology and Operations Management Area, INSEAD, 77305 Fontainebleau, France
Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering System Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

stephen.chick{at}insead.edu
hamed{at}mit.edu
dslevi{at}mit.edu

Annual influenza outbreaks incur great expenses in both human and monetary terms, and billions of dollars are being allocated for influenza pandemic preparedness in an attempt to avert even greater potential losses. Vaccination is a primary weapon for fighting influenza outbreaks. The influenza vaccine supply chain has characteristics that resemble the newsvendor problem but possesses several characteristics that distinguish it from many other supply chains. Differences include a nonlinear value of sales (caused by the nonlinear health benefits of vaccination that are due to infection dynamics) and vaccine production yield issues. We show that production risks, taken currently by the vaccine manufacturer, lead to an insufficient supply of vaccine. Several supply contracts that coordinate buyer (governmental public health service) and supplier (vaccine manufacturer) incentives in many other industrial supply chains cannot fully coordinate the influenza vaccine supply chain. We design a variant of the cost-sharing contract and show that it provides incentives to both parties so that the supply chain achieves global optimization and hence improves the supply of vaccines.

Subject classifications: inventory/production; health care; epidemiology; industries; pharmaceutical.
History: Received May 2006; revision received November 2007; accepted December 2007.







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