Operations Research
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Vol. 55, No. 2, March-April 2007, pp. 292-302
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1060.0346
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Anily, S.
Right arrow Articles by Haviv, M.
Right arrow Search for Related Content

The Cost Allocation Problem for the First Order Interaction Joint Replenishment Model

Shoshana Anily, Moshe Haviv

Recanati School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
Department of Statistics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905, Israel

anily{at}post.tau.ac.il
haviv{at}mscc.huji.ac.il

We consider an infinite-horizon deterministic joint replenishment problem with first order interaction. Under this model, the setup transportation/reorder cost associated with a group of retailers placing an order at the same time equals some group-independent major setup cost plus retailer-dependent minor setup costs. In addition, each retailer is associated with a retailer-dependent holding-cost rate. The structure of optimal replenishment policies is not known, thus research has focused on optimal power-of-two (POT) policies. Following this convention, we consider the cost allocation problem of an optimal POT policy among the various retailers. For this sake, we define a characteristic function that assigns to any subset of retailers the average-time total cost of an optimal POT policy for replenishing the retailers in the subset, under the assumption that these are the only existing retailers. We show that the resulting transferable utility cooperative game with this characteristic function is concave. In particular, it is a totally balanced game, namely, this game and any of its subgames have nonempty core sets. Finally, we give an example for a core allocation and prove that there are infinitely many core allocations.

Subject classifications: inventory/production; infinite-horizon; deterministic; multiretailer; lot-sizing; games; cooperative.
History: Received December 2003; revision received January 2006; accepted January 2006.







HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 2007 by INFORMS.