Operations Research
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Vol. 53, No. 4, July-August 2005, pp. 689-697
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1040.0198
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Gal, S.
Right arrow Articles by Howard, J. V.
Right arrow Search for Related Content

Rendezvous-Evasion Search in Two Boxes

S. Gal, J. V. Howard

Department of Statistics, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel
Department of Statistics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom

sgal{at}univ.haifa.ac.il
j.v.howard{at}lse.ac.uk

An agent (who may or may not want to be found) is located in one of two boxes. At time 0 suppose that he is in box B. With probability p he wishes to be found, in which case he has been asked to stay in box B. With probability 1–p he tries to evade the searcher, in which case he may move between boxes A and B. The searcher looks into one of the boxes at times 1, 2, 3, ... . Between each search the agent may change boxes if he wants. The searcher is trying to minimise the expected time to discovery. The agent is trying to minimise this time if he wants to be found, but trying to maximise it otherwise. This paper finds a solution to this game (in a sense defined in the paper), associated strategies for the searcher and each type of agent, and a continuous value function v(p) giving the expected time for the agent to be discovered. The solution method (which is to solve an associated zero-sum game) would apply generally to this type of game of incomplete information.

Subject classifications: search and surveillance:rendezvous search; evasion search; games and group decisions:teams.
History: Received October 2003; revision received March 2004; accepted April 2004.




This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Operations ResearchHome page
D. Rosenberg, E. Solan, and N. Vieille
Protocols with No Acknowledgment
Operations Research, July 1, 2009; 57(4): 905 - 915.
[Abstract] [PDF]




HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 2005 by INFORMS.